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Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets:
A Review of the Uniform Law Conference of




No jurisdiction in Canada has yet enacted comprehensive legislation regarding
fiduciary access to the digital assets of an individual who has died, become
incapacitated, or has appointed an attorney or other representative. In August,
2016, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) adopted a uniform Act on
fiduciary access to digital assets (ULCC Uniform Act). This paper discusses why
there may be a need for legislation, and then examines the most important elements
of the ULCC Uniform Act. The Act, which tends to favour fiduciary access and
media neutrality, is compared throughout the paper with the two American Acts
prepared by the American Uniform Law Commission. The first American Act was
adopted in 2014 and then withdrawn due to concerns voiced by internet service
providers and civil liberty groups regarding privacy issues, and the other, a revised
version, was subsequently adopted in 2015.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 2016, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada (ULCC) adopted
model legislation on access to the digital assets of individuals by persons standing
in a fiduciary relationship with them.1 The model legislation represents the first
attempt in Canada to comprehensively deal with the legal issues raised by the
need for fiduciaries to access digital assets when an individual is incapacitated,
appoints a legal representative or is dead. Only Alberta has passed legislation
that directly addresses some of the issues regarding fiduciary access to digital
assets, and even then, only when those issues arise due to an individual’s death.2
For the purpose of discussion, the definition of digital assets in the ULCC
Uniform Act is apposite. Section 1 of the Act defines ‘‘digital asset” as:
a record that is created, recorded, transmitted or stored in digital or
other intangible form by electronic, magnetic or optical means or by
any other similar means. 3
1 Uniform Law Commission,Uniform Access to Digital Assets by Fiduciaries Act (2016),
(Uniform Law Conference of Canada, 2016), online: <http://www.ulcc.ca > [ULCC
Uniform Act].
2 Estate Administration Act, S.A. 2014, c. E-12.5 [AB Estate Act]. See also Wills, Estates
and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 [WESA].
3 ULCCUniformAct, supra note 1, s. 1. The notes to s. 1 of theULCCUniformAct further
state that ‘‘record” is to be defined by the particular jurisdiction if not defined in its
Interpretation Act. British Columbia is an example of a province in which the term
‘‘record” is defined in section 29 of its Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238:“record”
includes books, documents, maps, drawings, photographs, letters, vouchers, papers and
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The notes to the definition of ‘‘digital assets” in the ULCC Uniform Act
specifically provide that:
It refers to any type of electronically stored information, such as
1) any information stored on a computer and other digital
devices,
2) content uploaded onto websites, ranging from photos to
documents, and
3) rights in digital property, such as domain names or digital
entitlements associated with online games and material created
online.4
The notes to s. 1 of the ULCC Uniform Act state that the proposed
legislation is limited to those records that are stored or transmitted in electronic
form and not to any underlying assets of a tangible nature.5
Digital assets include information stored on a computer and other digital
devices, content uploaded to websites or to the cloud (such as photos and
documents), domain names, and more ephemeral, or virtual, ‘‘rights” to digital
property including ‘‘digital entitlements associated with online games and
material created online.” 6
In its prefatory notes to the ULCC Uniform Act, the ULCC alludes to both
the increasing prevalence of digital assets and their value.7 Canadians are some of
the most connected people in the world. Over 83% of households have access to
the internet at home, with that figure increasing to 94% among those households
in the top 50 percentile of incomes.8 Moreover, Canadians are the most intensive
users on the planet, accessing an average of over 3700 web pages per month.9
One consequence is that more and more of people’s lives are lived on the internet
any other thing on which information is recorded or stored by any means whether
graphic, electronic, mechanical or otherwise.The notes to ‘‘record” in the ULCC
UniformAct, supra, note 1, s. 1 also provide that, ‘‘The term ‘information’ is not defined.
However, a jurisdiction may determine that it wishes to define the term to clarify what
information the Act applies to.” See also the notes to ‘‘digital assets” in the ULCC
Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 1, which provide that, ‘‘The term does not include an
underlying asset or liability unless the asset or liability is itself an electronic record.”
4 Ibid, s. 1.
5 Ibid.
6 See notes to s. 1 (‘‘fiduciary”) in the ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
7 See prefatory notes to ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
8 For statistics on household internet access, see Statistics Canada, Canadian Internet Use
Survey 2012 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 26 November 2013), online: <www.stat-
can.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/131126/dq131126d-eng.htm> [Canadian Internet Use Sur-
vey]. For statistics on internet use by age group, see Statistics Canada, Canadian Internet
use survey, Internet use at home, by age group and frequency of use, CANSIMTable 358-
0129 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2010), online: <www.statcan.gc.ca>. These figures
are likely even higher today.
9 Canadian Internet Use Survey, supra note 8.
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where they may be engaged in any number of the following activities including,
among other things, online banking, investing, e-mail and social media, dating
profiles, games, music, shopping accounts, or various reward schemes.
Some years ago these ‘‘digital” assets were valued at about $55,000 USD per
individual.10 To the extent, however, that ‘‘access” is not ‘‘ownership,” the
number may be misleadingly high. Some digital assets may be owned, but others
may constitute mere licenses or subscriptions with a limited life, often ceasing on
the death of the licensee or subscriber, or after a period of inactivity in the
account. One question is whether the laws of property and succession should be
amended to ensure their inheritability.11 It is a question that is, for the
foreseeable future, highly speculative, and will only be tangentially addressed in
this paper, if, for no other reason than the notes to the definition of digital asset
state that a fiduciary’s access to a record does not entitle ‘‘the fiduciary to own
the asset [(]or otherwise engage in transactions with the asset[)].” 12
The focus of this paper will be on how present federal and provincial law
assists or impedes fiduciary access and on the extent to which the proposed
ULCC Uniform Act provides solutions to access problems.
Many of the issues considered in this paper have been examined by the both
the popular press13 and by academics,14 although relatively little has been written
about the legal position in Canada.
10 Kelly Greene, ‘‘Passing Down Digital Assets”, Wall Street Journal (31 August 2012),
online: <wsj.com>.
11 Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, ‘‘Who Owns a Decedent’s E-Mails:
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?” (2007) 10 NYUJ Legis &
Pub Pol’y 281 [Darrow].
12 See notes to ‘‘digital asset” in the ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 1.
13 Bob Rankin, ‘‘[RIP] Digital Estate Planning” (24 February 2016), Ask Bob Rankin
(blog), online: <www.askbobrankin.com/rip-digital-estate-planning.html>; Rosa
Marchitelli, ‘‘Go Public — Apple demands widow get court order to access dead
husband’s password: Digital property after death a murky issue, says estate lawyer” (18
January 2016), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca>; Richard Weiland, ‘‘Planning for
and Administering Digital Assets” (2014), online: <www.cwilson.com>
14 For consideration of these issues in Canada, see John Gregory, ‘‘Fiduciaries’ Access to
Digital Assets” (9 January 2014), online: <www.slaw.ca> [Gregory, ‘‘Fiduciaries’
Access”]; John Gregory, ‘‘The Digital Consequences of Death (or Disability)” (24
February 2012), online: <www.slaw.ca>; Robert Hester, ‘‘Whose Life is It Anyway?
Managing the Life andDeath of Online User Accounts” (2012) 32:1 Est Tr & Pensions J
5; Daniel A. Nelson, ‘‘The Challenge of Digital Estate Administration for Executors”
(2012) 32:1 Est Tr & Pensions J 11; Joanna Vatau, ‘‘The Importance of Planning Your
Digital Estate” (2012) 32:1 Est Tr& Pensions J 1; PJWells, ‘‘Digital Assets: Advising the
Testator” (2012) 32:1 Est Tr & Pensions J 28. For consideration of these issues in foreign
journals, see Natalie M. Banta, ‘‘Death and Privacy in the Digital Age” (2016) 94 NCL
Rev 927; Natalie M. Banta, ‘‘Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in
Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death” (2014) 83:2 Fordham L Rev 799;
Naomi R. Cahn, ‘‘Probate Law Meets the Digital Age” (2014) 67 Vand L Rev 1697
[Cahn]; Naomi R. Cahn, Christina Kunz & Suzanne BrownWalsh, ‘‘Digital Assets and
Fiduciaries” (2016) in John A. Rothschild, ed., Research Handbook on Electronic Law
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This paper is divided into three parts. Part I addresses the present law on
fiduciary access to digital assets. It looks at possible impediments in the present
law to fiduciary access and at the attempt in Alberta to address the issue for
fiduciaries who are personal representatives. In the absence of legislation in other
provinces, possible approaches to fiduciary access are suggested but found
inadequate. Part II shows how the type of fiduciary and the characteristics of a
digital asset impact fiduciary access under the various legislative models. The
relatively simple Canadian rule of default access is compared to the more
complex regimes in the American Acts. Finally, Part III describes some of the
issues arising from the access conferred under the Canadian and American
legislative models.
I. IMPEDIMENTS TO FIDUCIARY ACCESS
The American Acts purport to be nothing more than an ‘‘overlay statute
designed to work with a state’s laws” 15 and to ensure fiduciary access. This is the
also the position in the ULCC Uniform Act,16 but to the extent that both the
(2016), online:<www.ssrn.com/abstract=2603398>; ElizabethHollandCapel, ‘‘Con-
flict and Solution inDelaware’s FiduciaryAccess toDigital Assets andDigital Accounts
Act” (2015) 30 Berkeley Tech LJ 1211; Jennifer A. Davis, ‘‘Counseling Clients for
#Digital Death” (2015) 32:12 The Computer and Internet Lawyer 1; Rachael E.
Ferrante, ‘‘The Relationship Between Digital Assets and Their Transference at Death:
‘It’s Complicated’” (2013) 15 Loy J Pub Int L 37; SamanthaD.Haworth, ‘‘Note: Laying
Your Online Self to Rest: Evaluating the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets
Act” (2014) 68UMiamiLRev 535; LeslieA.Gordon, ‘‘OnlineHeirs:Delaware leads the
way in adopting legislation on executors’ digital assets” (2015) 101:7 ABA Journal 10;
James D. Lamm et al, ‘‘The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal and State Laws
Prevent Fiduciaries fromManagingDigital Property” (2013-14) 68UMiami LRev 385;
Jeehyeon (Jenny) Lee, ‘‘Death andLiveFeeds: Privacy Protection inFiduciaryAccess to
Digital Assets” (2016) Colum Bus L Rev 654; Laura McCarthy, ‘‘Digital Assets and
Intestacy” (2015) 21:2 BU J Sci & Tech L 384; Jena L. Levin, ‘‘Trust Administration in
theDigital Age” (2015) 154:5 Trusts & Estates 43; JulianaM. Spaeth,Mark J. Plotkin &
Sandra C. Sheets, ‘‘Privacy, Eh!: The Impact of Canada’s Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act on Transnational Business” (2002) 4 Vand J
EntL&Prac 28;MollyWilkens, ‘‘Privacy andSecurityDuringLife,AccessAfterDeath:
AreTheyMutuallyExclusive?” (2011) 62HastingsLJ 1037;TylerG.Tarney, ‘‘ACall for
Legislation to Permit the Transfer of Digital Assets at Death” (2012) 40:3 Cap U LReb
773.
15 The Uniform Law Commission of the United States has produced two model Acts, one
in 2014 and a revised model Act in 2015:Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act,
Uniform Law Commission (approved July 2014), online: <www.uniformlaws.org>
[2014 FADAA];RevisedUniformFiduciary Access toDigital Assets Act (2015),Uniform
Law Commission, (approved July, 2015), online: <www.uniformlaws.org> [Revised
FADAA].
16 Uniform LawConference of Canada, Progress Report, Uniform Access to Digital Assets
by Fiduciaries Act, by Donna L.Molzan (Yellowknife: ULCC, August 2015) at para. 25
[Molzan, Progress Report].
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Canadian and American Acts have added caveats ‘‘respecting the privacy and
intention of the account holder,”17 some new law and policy is inevitably made.
1. Fiduciary powers and property aspects of digital assets
To quote John Gregory, a Canadian liaison18 to the drafting committee for
the US model Acts:
One may ask, then, why Canadian jurisdictions might need legislation
on this topic [access to digital assets]. Is it not clear that someone acting
on someone else’s behalf has all the powers necessary so to act, really all
the powers him- or herself at least for the purpose of administering the
person’s affairs? Who doubts it? Can a program of education suffice, to
alert people that they need to ensure that their fiduciaries are capable of
accessing their digital assets-have a list of accounts and passwords, for
example.19
The ULCC Uniform Act governs four types of fiduciaries: personal
representatives for a deceased account holder; a guardian appointed for an
account holder; an attorney appointed for an account holder who is the donor of
the power of attorney; and a trustee appointed to hold in trust a digital asset or
other property of an account holder.20 An ‘‘account holder” is defined as ‘‘an
individual who has entered into a service agreement21 with a custodian.”22 A
‘‘custodian” is ‘‘a person who holds, maintains, processes, receives or stores a
digital asset of an account holder.” 23
The notes to the ULCC Uniform Act also state that the term ‘‘guardian” is
not intended to apply to guardians of a minor who is not deceased and that the
term ‘‘trustee” is not intended to apply to a trustee in bankruptcy. 24 The Act also
does not apply to an employer’s digital asset ‘‘that is used by an employee in the
ordinary course of the employer’s business,”25 nor does it appear to apply to the
personal digital assets of employees held in employers’ internal e-mail systems.26
17 See notes to s. 1 of the ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1; ‘‘News”, 2014 FADAA, supra
note 15.
18 John Gregory, Former General Counsel in the Justice Policy Development Branch,
Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), and Donna L. Molzan, Q.C., Legislative
Reform, Alberta Justice & Solicitor General were Canadian liaisons from the ULCC to
the ULC in the drafting of the 2014 FADAA.
19 See Gregory, ‘‘Fiduciaries’ Access”, supra note 14.
20 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, ss. 1-2.




24 See ULCC Uniform Act, ibid, at notes to s. 1.
25 See ibid, at notes to s. 2(2).
26 Ibid.
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Employees are not generally account holders, since employers do not hold the
personal digital assets of employees pursuant to a service agreement.27
a. Personal representatives in Alberta and British Columbia
Alberta is the only jurisdiction in Canada that has introduced specific
legislation to ensure that the personal representative of a deceased individual has
access to, and hence is able to administer, digital assets.28 Both John D. Gregory
and Donna L. Molzan drew the Alberta bill to the attention of the chair of the
US drafting committee, Suzanne Walsh.29 Gregory characterized the Alberta
legislation as general enough in scope to confer authority and to be ‘‘media
neutral.”30 It is noteworthy, however, that the Act applies only to fiduciaries who
are personal representatives.
A personal representative of a deceased is the executor or administrator of
the deceased’s estate. Where there is a will, one or more executors are normally
appointed under its terms. If there is no will, or no executor is able or willing to
act, the court appoints an administrator of the estate. A personal representative
is required, under the common law and legislation, to administer the estate as a
fiduciary, with the attendant responsibilities.31
Under the common law, a personal representative, to use a well-worn phrase,
steps into the shoes of the deceased.32 In addition, estates legislation in most
provinces includes references to management of ‘‘property,” or an extended
definition of property or, in some provinces to ‘‘assets” or ‘‘estate.”33 The
personal representative has the duty to:
. gather in property,
27 Ibid, s. 1, definitions of ‘‘account holder” and ‘‘custodian”.
28 AB Estate Act, supra note 2.
29 See letter fromDonnaL.Molzan,Q.C. to SuzanneWalsh (7March 2014),UniformLaw
Commission, online: <www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Acces-
s%20to%20Digital%20Assets/2014mar7_FADA_Molzan%20msg%20and%20Ad-
min%20Act_Bill%20004.pdf>; Letter from John D. Gregory to Suzanne Walsh &
Naomi Cahn (17 March 2014), Uniform Law Commission, online: <www.uniform-
laws.org/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%20to%20Digital%20Assets/
2014mar17_FADA_Comments_Gregory.pdf> [Gregory, ‘‘Letter”].
30 Gregory, ‘‘Letter”, ibid.
31 See James MacKenzie, Feeney’s Canadian Law of Wills, 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis,
2000) at § 8.13.
32 DonovanW.M.Waters,MarkGillen & Lionel Smith,Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada,
4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2012) at 48.
33 The definition of personal estate includes [emphasis added regarding ‘‘property” in this
footnote]:
British Columbia, WESA, supra note 2, s. 142 confers broad powers on the personal
representative but, s. 1 states:
‘‘property” means land and personal property, and ‘‘personal property” means every kind of
property other than land;
Saskatchewan, Administration of Estates Act, S.S. 1998, c. A-4.1, s. 1 states:
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. pay the deceased’s creditors, and
. transfer what is left or the value thereof to the deceased’s heirs either under
the terms of the will of the deceased individual, or if there is no will, under
intestate succession legislation of the provinces. 34
To the extent that digital assets are not considered to be property or a
‘‘thing” mentioned in the applicable statute, it could be argued, that probate and
estates legislation provide that the personal representative has no responsibility,
or right, to manage those assets.
The drafting committee of the ULCC Uniform Act were in favour of ‘‘a
statutory rule to confirm the implied authority of a fiduciary over all digital
assets”, although the point appeared to be to make the power to exercise that
‘‘letters of administration” means all letters of administration of the property of a deceased
person, with or without the will annexed and whether granted for general, special or limited
purposes; There is no definition of ‘‘letters probate.”
s. 32 further states:
On an application to pass the accounts of an executor or administrator, a judge may conduct a
full inquiry concerning, and a full accounting of, all property that the deceased was possessed of
or entitled to and the administration and disbursement of that property.
Manitoba, The Trustee Act, C.C.S.M. 2015, c. T160, s. 1 states:
‘‘personal estate” includes leasehold estates and other chattels real, and also money, shares of
government and other funds, securities for money (not being real estate), debts, choses in action,
rights, credits, goods, and all other property, except real estate, that by law devolves upon the
executor or administrator, and any share or interest therein;
See also The Court of Queen’s Bench Surrogate Practice Act, C.C.S.M. 2014, c. C290.
Ontario: Estates Administration Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.22, s. 2(1) states:
All real and personal property that is vested in a person without a right in any other person to
take by survivorship, on the person’s death, whether testate or intestate and despite any
testamentary disposition, devolves to and becomes vested in his or her personal representative
from time to time as trustee for the persons by law beneficially entitled thereto, and, subject to
the payment of the person’s debts and so far as such property is not disposed of by deed, will,
contract or other effectual disposition, it shall be administered, dealt with and distributed as if it
were personal property not so disposed of.
Newfoundland and Labrador: Trustee Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. T-10, s. 2 states:
(i)‘‘property” includes real and personal chattels and an estate and interest in property, and a
debt, and a thing in action, and other rights or interests, whether in possession or not;
(n) ‘‘trustee“ includes executor or administrator and a trustee whose trust arises by construction
or implication of law, as well as an express trustee.
See also Judicature Act, S.N.L. 1990, c. J-4, Part VI, ss. 108-132.
New Brunswick, Probate Court Act, S.N.B. 1982, c. P-17.1, s. 1:‘‘administration” includes all
letters of administration of the property of deceased persons, whether with or without the will
annexed, and whether granted for general, special or limited purposes;‘‘probate” includes all
letters probate relating to the property of a deceased person whether granted for general, special
or limited purposes;Section 38 also provides:Except as otherwise provided . . . the Court, in
granting probate or administration shall be governed by the principles of the common law;
PEI, Probate Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. P-21, s. 1 states:
(l) ‘‘personal estate” or ‘‘personal property” means leasehold estate and other chattels real, and
also moneys, shares, stocks, debentures, bonds, securities for money, (not being real estate),
debts, choses in action, rights, credits, goods, and all other property which prior to October 2,
1939, devolved upon the executor or administrator, and any share or interest therein;
Nova Scotia, Probate Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 31, s. 1 states:(k) ‘‘property” means real or personal
property and includes, for greater certainty, a chose in action.
34 See AB Estate Act, supra note 2, s. 7(1)(c);WESA, supra note 2, s. 162(3)(d).
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authority clear to custodians and the courts, rather than to specifically address
the property argument.35
Section 20 of the Alberta Estate Administration Act includes the authority
‘‘to do all things concerning the property that are necessary to give effect to any
authority or powers vested in the personal representative.”36 The Alberta Act
also contains a broad definition of property — a term not defined in its
predecessor Act.37 The definition of property in the new Alberta Act provides:
(i) real and personal property, as well as rights or interests in them,
(ii) anything regarded in law or equity as property or as an interest in property,
(iii) any right or interest that can be transferred for value from one person to another,
and
(iv) any right, including a contingent or future right, to be paid money or receive
any other type of money, and
(v) any cause of action, to the extent that it relates to property or could result in a
judgment regarding a person to pay money.38
Finally, s. 20(1)(b) of the new Alberta Act lists one of the core tasks of a
personal representative to be the identification of estate assets and liabilities
including “compiling a list, [of] . . . the value of all land and buildings, a summary of
outstanding mortgages, leases and other encumbrances, and online accounts . . .” .39
Although British Columbia legislation regarding estates adheres to a more
traditional definition of property, it does define ‘‘personal property” to mean
‘‘every kind of property other than land.”40 Section 142 of the Act, which
describes the general authority of a personal representative, is broadly drawn,
and specifically provides that a personal representative has ‘‘the same authority
over the estate in respect of which the personal representative is appointed as the
deceased person would have if living.”41
b. Other provinces and other approaches
The Alberta and British Columbia legislation is limited to personal
representatives and thus falls short of complete provincial regimes to govern
fiduciary access to digital assets. For all other jurisdictions, there is no legislation
dealing specifically with digital assets.
In the absence of legislation, a number of approaches have been suggested
for the treatment of digital assets and access to them by fiduciaries. Two early
American commentators, Jonathan J. Darrow and Gerald R. Ferrero,42
35 Molzan, Progress Report, supra note 16.
36 AB Estate Act, supra note 2, s. 20(1).
37 Administration of Estates Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-2, as repealed by AB Estate Act, ibid.
38 AB Estate Act, ibid, s. 20(1)(b) [emphasis added].
39 Ibid [emphasis added].
40 WESA, supra note 2, s, 1.
41 Ibid.
42 Darrow, supra note 11 at 281.
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proposed recasting the relationship between the account holder and custodian, as
one of bailor and bailee.43 In that case, the bailor/owner, and thus his or her
fiduciary, would be able to get the digital asset back pursuant to generally
understood and extant bailment law. Under Canadian law, however, bailment is
reserved for tangible personal property with certain limited exceptions for
negotiable instruments and warehouse receipts. These torts are not
conventionally applicable to intangible property (unlike in the United
States44). But even Darrow and Ferrero admit that, in any case, legislation
would have to be introduced to override the service agreements between account
holders and custodians, although they do suggest that from a broader
perspective, ‘‘public policy considerations might allow a court . . . [to render]
boilerplate termination clauses ineffective in the face of society’s increasing
dependence on electronic communication and the significant disruption that
might result if heirs were denied access to accounts.”45
An alternative approach is based on the property or property-like attributes
of digital assets. The argument is that if a thing is property, then the owner or her
representative has (or perhaps, should have) a right of access. This is an
argument that extends beyond fiduciary access and speaks to the inheritability of
digital assets.
It is a debatable point whether digital assets are property. To quote Binnie J.
in the leading Canadian case of Saulnier (Receiver of) v. Saulnier46 (on whether
an annual fishing license is property), ‘‘property,” is a ‘‘term of some elasticity
that takes its meaning from the context.”47 He also noted that ‘‘many things that
have commercial value do not constitute property, while the value of some
property may be minimal.”48 In many cases digital assets will exist simply as
information. Whether information is property, not surprisingly, depends on the
context49.
43 Ibid, at 301-308.
44 Ibid, at 306.
45 Ibid, at 308.
46 2008 SCC 58, 2008 CarswellNS 569, 2008 CarswellNS 570 (S.C.C.) [Saulnier].
47 Ibid, at para. 16.
48 Ibid, at para. 42.
49 In the leadingEnglish case ofPhipps v. Boardman, [1965] 3All E.R. 721 (U.K.H.L.) aff’g
[1965] 1All E.R. 849 (C.A.) aff’g [1964] 2All E.R. 187 (H.C.), themajority of judges at all
three levels of decision found that the information acquired by the fiduciary while acting
for a trustwas property of the trust. InStewart v. TheQueen, 1988CarswellOnt 110, 1988
CarswellOnt 960, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 (S.C.C.) [Stewart], the Supreme Court of Canada
also considered whether information is property and held it was not for the purposes of
the interpretation of s. 283 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34 [Criminal Code
1970]. The Court cited a lack of precedent and was evidently concerned that if
confidential information was property for the purposes of s. 288 (theft) (see Criminal
Code 1970, supra note 49), other sections of the Criminal Code would apply with
uncertain consequences. The Court in Stewart does suggest that information may be
property for the purposes of the civil law but states at para. 23 (see Stewart supra note 49)
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This approach is unlikely to succeed. There is no doctrine in the common law
that gives a general right to access one’s property. An example, well known to
property students, is ‘‘landlocked” real property to which access by the owner is
denied. Relief is granted only in exceptional circumstances.50 Where the property
is personal, not real property, the right of access seems even more unlikely,
although the English High Court in Moffatt v. Kazana,51 expressed some doubts
on the matter. InMoffat, the court had to consider the rights of the true owner of
a money box hidden in an upstairs attic of a house the owner had sold. The box
was ostensibly forgotten by the owner. In his judgment, Wrangham J. posed a
hypothetical in which the new homeowner found the box but, while not claiming
ownership, denied its true owner the right to cross his land in order to claim it.52
But as Wrangham J. observed, these difficulties remained to be addressed in a
case in which they actually arise.53
It is nevertheless the case that some service agreements provide that the
account holder’s intellectual property remains her property (that of the account
holder),54 and for most account holders the predominant type of intellectual
property will be copyright. The Copyright Act provides that copyright shall
subsist in Canada ‘‘in every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
work.”55 Copyright is not, of course, limited to high art or literature. It is quite
that ‘‘the cases demonstrate English and Canadian civil law protect confidential
information.However, the legal basis for doing so has not been clearly established by the
cases.”See also the comments regarding ‘‘information” to s. 1 (‘‘digital assets”) of the
ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
50 An easement of necessity will arise for land that is landlocked at the time of transfer, but
only if there is some land retained by the grantor over which access can be exercised. See
B.O.J. Properties Ltd. v. Allen’s Ltd., 1979 CarswellNS 82, 108 DLR (3d) 305 (N.S.
C.A.). In Sweet v. Sommer, [2004] E.W.H.C. 1504 (Ch.), 4 All E.R. 288 (Ch. Div.) (U.K.
H.C.), the Court held that the owner would be denied access if the only option for access
was for the grantor to tear down a building the grantor owned.
51 [1969] 2 Q.B. 152, [1968] 3 All E.R. 271 (U.K. H.C.) [cited to All E.R.] [Moffatt].
52 Moffatt, ibid at 275.
53 Ibid. Rights and access to chattels, not real property, are also divided under the
limitations Acts of most provinces under which the right to recovery in court is time
limited, but the right to the thing is not specifically extinguished (recaption). See Bruce
Ziff, Principles of Property Law, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell: 2014) at 150.
54 See e.g. Google, ‘‘Terms of Service”, online: <https://google.com>:
‘‘Some of our Services allow you to upload, submit, store, send or receive content. You retain
ownership of any intellectual property rights that you hold in that content. In short, what
belongs to you stays yours”;
Dropbox, ‘‘Terms of Service, Your Stuff & Your Permissions”, online: <https://
www.dropbox.com>:
‘‘When you use our Services, you provide us with things like your files, content, email
messages, contacts and so on (‘‘Your Stuff”). Your Stuff is yours. These terms don’t give us
any rights to Your Stuff except for the limited rights that enable us to offer the Services”
[Dropbox].
55 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 5(1).
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS 203
possible that copyright arises even in quotidian emails. (And doubtless, there is
sometimes a high level of ‘‘originality” in dating profiles.)56 Originality has been
interpreted to imply skill and judgment: ‘‘[m]ere industry or ‘sweat of the brow’ is
not enough; nor is creativity necessary.”57 In other words, copyright is a form of
property that can apply to some digital assets, even relatively banal ones.
While a provision in the terms of the service agreement that guarantees the
account holder’s right to ‘‘your stuff”58 will generally serve to prevent its
appropriation by the custodian, it does not guarantee the right of the copyright
owner or her representative to access it. An analogy can be made to the owner of
the copyright in the contents of a tangible asset such as a letter. It is trite law that
the sender/copyright owner does not have any rights to access the letter (or
obtain copies), and the recipient has no obligation to preserve the letter.59 On the
other hand, there is a conveyance or giving up of the contents of a letter, which
may not truly be comparable to copyrighted digital assets retained by an internet
service provider.
2. The terms of service agreements
The interposition of a new type of third party between a fiduciary and the
beneficiary’s assets, the Internet Service Provider, or custodian, has raised
additional obstacles to fiduciary access. The custodian may choose not cooperate
with the fiduciary to provide access, because of the custodian’s view of itself as a
protector of the account holder’s privacy and because of its fear that it may incur
liability for breaching that privacy.60 The custodian may also be protective of its
bottom line and be concerned with the costs of complying with individualized
access. Thus, in many service agreements between a custodian and an account
holder, the custodian may impose contractual terms that effectively deny access
to the fiduciary.
Service agreements are contracts of adhesion which generally fall into several
categories, including browse wrap agreements and click wrap agreements. Under
the latter type of agreement, the user/buyer indicates her assent to its terms by
clicking the box ‘‘I agree”. The legal efficacy of click-wrap agreements was
recognized in Rudder v. Microsoft Corp.:
56 See e.g. Ashley Madison, ‘‘Terms of Service”, online: <www.ashleymadison.com/app/
public/tandc.p?c=2>.
57 David Waver, Intellectual Property Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 100. See also
CCHCanadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339,
2004 CarswellNat 446, 2004 CarswellNat 447 (S.C.C.) at 48.
58 Dropbox, supra note 54.
59 But see ‘‘Property Rights in Letters (1937) 46:3 Yale LJ 493 (interest in physical
document at 493, legal interest of writer at 496).
60 See Section I.3, ‘‘Canadian privacy laws” in this article, below.
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On the present facts, the Membership Agreement [click wrap agree-
ment] must be afforded the sanctity that must be given to any
agreement in writing.61
A browse wrap agreement is like a click wrap agreement, except that there is
no ‘‘I accept” box, and the continued use of the website or website products will
generally indicate acceptance of the terms of use set out at the first of the
website.62
Currently, many, if not most, service agreements, except for those of certain
large social media platforms, do not include any references to fiduciaries. In the
absence of specific provisions in the service agreement, the practice of custodians
has ranged from refusal to recognize legal representatives, if any are appointed,
to extending access to family and friends with no legal standing, through an array
of non-traditional and ad hoc arrangements. 63
Where an account holder has died intestate, there may be no administrator
appointed for the estate. Intestates are disproportionately young and without
substantial assets.64 Further, friends and family may not seek appointment of an
administrator because many jurisdictions require the posting of a bond.65 In
those cases, unless the custodian provides informal access, there will be no one to
deal with the digital assets of the intestate, even though the intestate may have
had an online life worthy of preservation.66
Some service agreements may not provide for death or incapacity directly,
but contain provisions that provide for the deactivation of the account after a
period of inactivity.67 The service agreement may also prohibit the account
61 (1999) 1999 CarswellOnt 3195, [1999] O.J. No. 3778, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d.) 168, 40 C.P.C.
(4th) 394 (Ont. S.C.J.), at para. 18.
62 Century 21 Canada Ltd. Partnership v Rogers Communications Inc., 2011 BCSC 1196,
2011 CarswellBC 2348, [2011] B.C.J. No. 1679 (B.C. S.C.), but see North American
Systemshops Ltd. v King, 1989 CarswellAlta 111, [1989] A.J. No. 512, 68 Alta. L.R. (2d.)
145 (Alta. Q.B.) (regarding notice).
63 See Michael D. Roy, ‘‘Beyond the Digital Asset Dilemma: Will Online Services
Revolutionize Estate Planning?” (2011) 24:4 Quinnipiac Probate Law Journal 376 at
386.
For example, Yahoo initially declined a request made by the parents of a deceased US Marine to
access their son’s email account. The company was subsequently forced to provide access
through a court order. See Stefanie Olsen, ‘‘Yahoo releases e-mail of deceased Marine”, CNET
(22 April 2005), online: <www.cnet.com>. Another example occurred when Facebook denied
account access to the parents of a model who died in questionable circumstances. Their decision
not to grant access was upheld by a California court. See Jeff Roberts, ‘‘Dead model’s parents
can’t get Facebook messages, judge says”, Gigaom (27 September 2012), online:
<www.gigaom.com>.
64 Canadian Legal Wills, online: <https://www.legalwills.ca/>.
65 See e.g. Probate Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 31, s. 40. Some provinces provide for the expedited
administrationof small estates. See e. g.Administration ofEstatesAct, S.S. 1998, c.A-4.1,
s. 9. Section 9 applies to estates not exceeding $25,000 that contain no real property. The
fee is $30 and s. 9(1) provides that the ‘‘the personal property of a deceasedpersonbepaid
or delivered to a person named by the judge to be disposed of by that person . . . .”
66 Molzan, Progress Report, supra note 16 at para. 47.
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holder from transferring the account or sharing her password.68 In either case, a
fiduciary of a deceased or incapacitated account holder may effectively be denied
access. Even if the fiduciary can obtain the password to the account, the service
agreement may invalidate the account if a person other than the account holder
obtains access (although admittedly this may be hard to police).69 By shutting
down accounts at death or after a period of inactivity, custodians may eliminate
value or property, make it inaccessible, damage ongoing business and eliminate
the ability of an individual’s heirs to inherit property of sentimental value or even
of historical interest. From the custodians’ perspective, they are simply fulfilling
their users’ expectations of privacy and, by chance, eliminating cumbersome
administrative obligations.70
Facebook is one of the providers which now allows limited access to an
account of a deceased individual.71 However, the access is entirely mediated by
contract and circumvents considerations of fiduciary access and obligations.
Facebook allows an account holder to provide in advance through her security
settings whether, on death, her account is either to be deleted or
‘‘memorialized.”72
If an account is memorialized, no one can log into the account and its
contents may be shared only among the friends it was originally shared with. The
contents also cannot be changed. Depending on the privacy settings of the
account, friends can share memories of the deceased on the Timeline.
An ‘‘immediate” family member of a deceased, not clothed in any legal
authority, or an executor, may request that an account be deleted. In both cases,
there must be proof of death such as an obituary or memorial card and proof of
authority to act. The authority to act derives, it appears, from the possession of a
power of attorney, birth certificate, will, or estate letter.
It is also possible for an account holder before her death to designate, in the
security settings of her account, a ‘‘legacy contact.” A legacy contact must be a
member of Facebook and age 19 years or older. A legacy contact has limited
powers to update the profile and biography, respond to new friend requests, and
provide a post regarding the deceased or the deceased’s memorial service. The
legacy contact cannot log into the account, read the account holder’s messages,
or remove friends.
67 See e.g. Dropbox, supra note 54.
68 See e.g. Yahoo, ‘‘Terms of Service”, online: <policies.yahoo.com/ca/en/yahoo/terms/
utos>.
69 See e.g. Amazon, ‘‘Kindle Store Terms of Use”, online: <www.amazon.ca/gp/help/
customer/display.html?nodeId=201014950>, s. 3 (dealing with termination).
70 See e.g. Netchoice, online: <netchoice.org/>.
71 See Nate Russell, ‘‘Of Digital Legacies and Changes to Facebook’s Memorial Pages”,
Slaw (16 February 2015), online: <www.slaw.ca>.
72 Facebook, ‘‘Help”, online: <www.htpp: facebook.com/help>.
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3. Canadian privacy laws
The position of the drafters of the ULCC Uniform Act is that no Canadian
privacy legislation will hinder the operation of the Act and, implicitly that under
current law, fiduciary access is not barred by privacy legislation.73 They have
stated that the privacy Acts do not prevent the disclosure of personal
information of an individual to a fiduciary because ‘‘the fiduciary is obliged to
obtain the information to fulfill their duties.”74
While privacy legislation may not greatly impede fiduciary access, custodians
are governed by privacy legislation, and some limitations may be imposed on
fiduciary access. In addition, where the privacy rights of third parties are
concerned, the legislation may be engaged. This is particularly a concern where
the digital asset is e-mail or social media.75
There are two types of general privacy legislation in Canada governing non-
governmental actors.76 The federal Government enacted the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act77 (PIPEDA) in 2000 and
three provinces have elected to enact their own legislation, to be applied in lieu of
the federal legislation: British Columbia,78 Alberta79 and Quebec.80 These Acts
generally govern the collection, use and disclosure of personal information81 by
organizations,82 and, in the case of the federal Act, to organizations carrying on
73 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, notes to s. 5.
74 Ibid.
75 If a communication is public then the privacy Acts will not apply.
76 Also, the federal government and the provinces each have legislation regarding
government information collection and storage. The federal legislation is called the
Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21. The provincial legislation is generally described by the
acronym ‘‘FIPO,” Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. See e.g.
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165; Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. F-25.
77 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5
[PIPEDA].
78 Personal Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63 [BC PIPA].
79 Personal Information Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5 [AB PIPA].
80 Protection of Personal Information in the Private Sector, C.Q.L.R. c. P-39.1. This paper
will not deal with the non-common law jurisdiction of Quebec.
81 PIPEDA, supra note 77, s. 2(1):
- personal information means information about an identifiable individual;
BC PIPA, supra note 78, s 1:
- ‘‘personal information” means information about an identifiable individual and includes
employee personal information but does not include
(a) contact information, or
(b) work product information;
AB PIPA, supra note 79, s. 1(k):
- ‘‘personal information” means information about an identifiable individual.
82 PIPEDA, supra note 77, s. 2(1):
- ‘‘organization” includes an association, a partnership, a person and a trade union;
BC PIPA, supra note 78, s. 1:
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commercial activities.83 Custodians will fall within the definitions and the Acts
will apply.84 In addition there is sector specific legislation enacted by the federal
government and provinces related to, for example, the privacy of health
information. This paper will not deal directly with those types of legislation.
The other type of privacy legislation makes it a tort to violate the privacy of
another. Four common law jurisdictions in Canada have enacted legislation:
British Columbia,85 Saskatchewan,86 Manitoba,87 and Newfoundland and
Labrador.88 The legislation was enacted before the current prevalence of social
media and e-mail, and not with those means of communication in mind, but both
custodians and fiduciaries qualify as ‘‘persons.”89 The cases decided so far on the
application of the Acts have not dealt with fiduciary access.90
a. Privacy torts
All of the provincial legislation regarding privacy torts, except Manitoba,
provides that a right of action is extinguished by the death of the person whose
- ‘‘organization” includes a person or an unincorporated association, a trade union, a trust or
not for profit corporation, but does not include
(a) an individual acting in a personal or domestic capacity or acting as an employee,
(b) a public body,
(c) the Provincial Court , the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal,
(d) the Nisga’a Government, as defined in the Nisga’a Final Agreement, or
(e) the private trust for the benefit of the one or more designated individuals who are friends or
members of the family of the settlor;
AB PIPA, supra note 79, s. 1(1)(i):
- ‘‘organization” includes
(i) a corporation,
(ii) an unincorporated association,
(iii) a trade union as defined in the Labour Relations Code,
(iv) a partnership as defined in the Partnership Act, and
(v) an individual acting in a commercial capacity,
but does not include an individual acting in a personal or domestic capacity.
83 PIPEDA, supranote 77, ss. 1, 4: ‘‘commercial activity”means anyparticular transaction,
act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that is of a commercial character,
including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor, membership or other fundraising
lists.”
84 Fiduciaries will, in many cases, also fall within the definitions of ‘‘organizations” and in
the case of the federalAct, ‘‘carrying on commercial activities.” Therefore, the transfer of
information from fiduciary to beneficiaries also could be subject to the legislation. This
paper will focus on the transfer of information from custodian to fiduciary.
85 Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 273 [BC Privacy Act].
86 The Privacy Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-24 [SK Privacy Act].
87 The Privacy Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P125, C.C.S.M. c. P125 [MB Privacy Act].
88 Privacy Act, R.S.N.L. 1990, c. P-22 [NL Privacy Act].
89 See e.g. Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238, s. 29: ‘‘‘person’ includes a corporation,
partnership or party, and the personal or other legal representatives of a person towhom
the context can apply according to law”.
90 See Barbara McIsaac, Rick Shields, & Kris Klein, The Law of Privacy in Canada,
(Toronto: Carswell, 2004) (looseleaf consulted on 9 May 2017), para. 2.4.5 ff.
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privacy is alleged to have been violated, so personal representatives are exempted
from their purview, although the rights of third parties may still be violated by
the release of material to a fiduciary or where the fiduciary passes on the material
to heirs.91 Otherwise, all the statutes provide for the defense:
(d) that the defendant acted under authority conferred upon him by a
law in force in the province or by a court or any process of a court92
None of the Acts specifically define what the tort comprises, except to
provide that a person must ‘‘willfully without claim of right violate the privacy of
another person.”93 The Newfoundland Act provides that the nature and degree
of privacy to which an individual is entitled is that ‘‘which is reasonable in the
circumstances, regard being given to the lawful interests of others. . ..”94 This
theme of reasonableness, which supports fiduciary access to digital assets, is
repeated in the other Acts.95
When the Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland statutes reference
examples of violations of privacy, they refer to the ‘‘use” of certain materials
(which could include digital assets) such as ‘‘letters, diaries and other personal
documents” without consent as a prima facie violation of privacy.96
b. Federal and provincial legislation regarding the disclosure of personal
information by organizations
The federal Act provides that an organization may disclose personal
information without the knowledge or consent of the individual only in certain
enumerated situations.97 One exception is if the disclosure is made after the
91 BC Privacy Act, supra note 85, s. 5; SK Privacy Act, supra note 86, s. 9;NL Privacy Act,
supranote 88, s. 11. (Although this contradicts the generally broadpowers of fiduciaries.)
92 MBPrivacy Act, supra, note 87, s. 5(d); see also BCPrivacy Act, supra note 85, s. 2(2)(c);
SK Privacy Act, supra note 86, s. 4(1)(c); NL Privacy Act, supra note 88, s. 5(c).
93 SKPrivacyAct, supranote 86, s. 2.All theActs include this formulation:BCPrivacyAct,
supra note 85, s. 1(1);MBPrivacy Act, supra note 87, s. 2(1);NLPrivacy Act, supra note
88, s. 3(1) [emphasis added].
94 NL Privacy Act, supra note 88, s. 3(2).
95 BCPrivacy Act, supra note 85, s. 1(2); SKPrivacy Act, supra note 86, s. 6(1);MBPrivacy
Act, supra note 87, s. 2(1).
96 SKPrivacyAct, supra note 86, s. 3(d);MBPrivacyAct, supra note 87, s. 3(d);NLPrivacy
Act, supra note 88, s. 4(d). There is also a developing common law tort of invasion of
privacywhich has beenprimarily a construction of theOntario courts. That province has
no legislation comparable to the privacy legislation described above. In Jones v. Tsige,
2012 ONCA 32, 2012 CarswellOnt 274 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal held
therewas a tort of invasion of privacy in that province, specifically an action for intrusion
on the seclusion of an individual. The decision echoed many criteria already established
in the legislation. It held that liability would ensue if the defendant’s conduct was
intentional; the defendant’s conduct invaded the private affairs or concerns of the
plaintiff without lawful justification, and a reasonable person would regard the invasion
as highly offensive.
97 PIPEDA, supra note 77, s. 7(3).
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earlier of ‘‘one hundred years after the record containing the information was
created,”98 or ‘‘twenty years after the death of the individual whom the
information is about.”99 Therefore protection under the Act will be extended to
deceased account holders for any lesser period.
PIPEDA does not refer directly to the rights and responsibilities of a
fiduciary, although it implicitly recognizes them. Thus Principle 4.3.6 on Consent
states that ‘‘consent [for disclosure] can also be given by an authorized
representative (such as a legal guardian or a person having power of
attorney).”100
Disclosure without consent is also permitted pursuant to an order of ‘‘the
court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of
information”101 and where required ‘‘by law”.102 Given the responsibilities
imposed on a fiduciary under probate Acts, other legislation, and the common
law, fiduciary access might be subsumed under either of those provisions (i.e. a
court order or a legal requirement). British Columbia provides for disclosure if
‘‘the disclosure is required or authorized by law,”103 but Alberta’s list of reasons
for disclosure without consent simply refers to disclosure required by statutes,
regulations and bylaws and to disclosure of information that is reasonable for the
purposes of a legal proceeding.104
Clause 4.9 of Schedule l of PIPEDA sets forth ‘‘Principle 9 - Individual
Access” which permits an individual access to her own personal information.
This principle also refers to the individual’s ability to challenge the accuracy and
completeness of the information, but does not explicitly provide that access will
be limited to that circumstance.105 If the fiduciary steps into the shoes of the
beneficiary, the principle of individual access might permit the fiduciary to access
an individual’s digital assets held by a custodian. Access, however, is prohibited,
[i]f doing so would likely reveal personal information about a third
party. However, if the information about the third party is severable
from the record containing the information about the individual, the
organization shall sever the information about the third party before
giving the individual access.106
98 Ibid, s. 7(3)(h)(i).
99 Ibid, s. 7(3)(h)(ii). See also AB PIPA, supra note 79, ss. 4(1)(h)-(i).
100 Ibid, Schedule I. In addition, s. 7(3)(d.3),PIPEDA, ibid, specifically permits (but does not
require) an organization to make a disclosure on the initiative of a government
institution, the next of kin or an ‘‘authorized representative” of an individual in certain
cases where the individual has been a victim of financial abuse.
101 Ibid, s. 7(3)(c).
102 Ibid, s. 7(3)(i).
103 BC PIPA, supra note 78, s. 18(1)(o).
104 AB PIPA, supra note 79, s. 20(b)(m).
105 PIPEDA, supra note 77, Schedule I.
106 PIPEDA, ibid [emphasis added].
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The regulations to the British Columbia Act, and the Alberta Act, confer
explicit authority on certain fiduciaries to access information.
The BC regulations recognize a ‘‘representative” of an individual as:
(a) a committee under the Patients Property Act,
(b) an attorney acting under an enduring power of attorney,
(c) a litigation guardian, and
(d) a representative under the Representation Agreement Act.107
A representative may access the individual’s information and make a request
for a correction and more generally give consent to the collection, use and
disclosure of the individual’s personal information.108 If the individual is
deceased, those rights are conferred on the individual’s personal representative,
and if there is no personal representative (e.g. where there is no executor willing
or able to act, or no administrator is appointed for an intestate), on the nearest
relative of the individual.109 The nearest relative of an individual is defined to be
the first person who is a spouse, adult child, parent, adult brother or sister or
other adult relation by birth or adoption.110
The Alberta Act confers explicit rights on fiduciaries but the rights are
limited to those that relate to the rights and powers of their particular office.
Although the access rights conferred by the ULCC Uniform Act are not explicitly
limited, a fiduciary must act within the parameters of her fiduciary duties under
the general law. Thus, the Alberta Act provides that any right or power conferred
on an individual may be exercised by a guardian, but only if the exercise relates
to the powers and duties of the guardian,111 or by an attorney, but only if the
exercise relates to the powers and duties conferred by the power of attorney.112
Where the individual is deceased, the personal representative holds any right or
power conferred by the Act on the deceased individual, if the right or power
relates to the administration of the estate.113 No disclosure to an individual or
fiduciary is permitted if the disclosure would reveal personal information about
another individual.114 This provision has the potential to unreasonably interfere
or prevent the due administration of an individual’s estate.
The Alberta Act and B.C. regulations also permit disclosure to persons who
are not among the categories of traditional fiduciaries. This may remove an
impediment to custodian disclosure where authorization as a legal representative
is absent. British Columbia permits disclosure (and gives other rights) to ‘‘the
107 B.C. Reg. 473/2003, ss. 2(1)(a)-(d) [BC Reg].
108 Ibid, ss. 2(3)(a)-(c).
109 Ibid, s. 3.
110 Ibid, s. 1; ibid, s. 4 (definition of ‘‘nearest relative”).
111 AB PIPA, supra note 79, s. 61(1)(e).
112 Ibid, s. 61(1)(g).
113 Ibid, s. 61(1)(d)(i).
114 BC PIPA, supra note 78, s. 23(4)(c).
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nearest relative”115 if there is no personal representative. Alberta permits
disclosure ‘‘to the surviving spouse or adult interdependent partner or to a
relative of a deceased individual if, in the opinion of the organization, the
disclosure is reasonable.”116
ll. FIDUCIARY ACCESS UNDER THE PROPOSED MODEL
CANADIAN AND AMERICAN ACTS
1. The Canadian position: default access
Section 3(1) of the ULCC Uniform Act sets down the basic rule that ‘‘the
fiduciary of an account holder has the right to access a digital asset of the
account holder.”117 The ULCC Uniform Act does not distinguish among
different types of fiduciaries,118 whether they are attorneys, guardians or legal
representatives. They are treated alike, at least in the first instance, in which they
are permitted default access to digital assets. This default position can be
changed only by the terms of a power of attorney, trust, will or a grant of
administration, or by a court order.119
A service agreement that limits fiduciary access is void120 unless the account
holder accepts its terms by ‘‘an affirmative act separate from the account holder’s
assent to other provisions of the service agreement.”121
The notes to the ULCC Uniform Act state that the Act is intended to
‘‘facilitate access while respecting the privacy and intention of the account
holder.”122 Whether the proposed legislation strikes a proper balance is a
115 BC Reg, supra note 107, s. 1, definition of




(d) adult brother or sister;
(e) other adult relation by birth or adoption.
116 AB PIPA, supra note 79, s. 20(k).
117 Ibid.
118 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 1:‘‘fiduciary” in relation to an account holder,
means(a) a personal representative for a deceased account holder,(b) a guardian
appointed for the account holder,(c) an attorney appointed for an account holder who is
the donor of the power of attorney,(d) a trustee appointed to hold in trust a digital asset
or other property of an account holder.The notes accompanying the Act provide that
jurisdictions can provide separate definitions for each type of fiduciary. A fiduciary
under theULCCUniformAct does not include a guardian ofminor childrenwho are not
deceased, or trustees in bankruptcy. It also does not apply to ‘‘an employer’s digital asset
used by an employee in the ordinary course of business.” See text accompanying notes
20-27.
119 Ibid, s. 3(2).
120 Ibid, s. 5(2).
121 Ibid.
122 Prefatory notes to ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
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debatable point insofar as the ULCC Uniform Act generally treats fiduciary
access to digital assets like fiduciary access to other types of property and hence
is media neutral. It tends, moreover, to favour access (compared to the American
Acts), over privacy.
This approach contrasts with that in the two versions of the American model
Act developed by the Uniform Law Commission regarding fiduciary access to
digital assets.123
2. The American position: access depending on both the characteristics of
the digital asset and the type of fiduciary
a. Access depending on the characteristics of the particular digital asset: the
envelope/content distinction in the American uniform Acts
Early on in its mandate, the Canadian drafting committee for the ULCC
Uniform Act agreed to track the 2014 FADAA124 as closely as possible to
facilitate cooperation and compliance across borders.125 The Canadian
committee did not, however, adopt a key element of the American Acts,
namely, the content/envelope distinction. The distinction reflects the one adopted
in the American federal Stored Communications Act (SCA).126 That Act, which
was enacted in 1986, was intended to help preserve the privacy of internet users,
especially against the United States Government, by prohibiting service
providers from divulging the contents of stored electronic communications.127
123 Revised FADAA, supra note 15; 2014 FADAA, supra note 15.
124 Ibid.
125 Molzan, Progress Report, supra note 16 at para. 7.
126 Stored Communications Act, 18 USC §§ 2701-2711 (1986).
127 18 USC §2702(a):Prohibitions.—Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c)—(1) a
person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public shall not
knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in
electronic storage by that service; and(2) a person or entity providing remote computing
service to the public shall not knowingly divulge to any person or entity the contents of
any communicationwhich is carriedormaintainedon that service—(A)onbehalf of, and
received by means of electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer
processing of communications received by means of electronic transmission from), a
subscriber or customer of such service;(B) solely for the purpose of providing storage or
computer processing services to such subscriber or customer, if the provider is not
authorized to access the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing
any services other than storage or computer processing; and(3) a provider of remote
computing service or electronic communication service to the public shall not knowingly
divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of such
service (not including the contents of communications coveredbyparagraph (1) or (2)) to
any governmental entity.
This excludes material stored on computers, tablets and other personal electronic devices and
opened e-mails even if stored by the service provider because they are not being stored for
‘‘backup.” ‘‘Electronic storage” is defined in 18 USC §2510 (17) (incorporated by 18 US
§2711(1)):
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It also criminalized anyone who intentionally accessed ‘‘without authorization” a
facility through which an electronic service is provided.128 Because there is no
reference to fiduciaries in the SCA, the SCA (theoretically at least) in the words
of one expert ‘‘present[s] a seemingly nasty glitch for fiduciaries attempting to
marshal a decedent’s digital assets.”129 It should be noted, however that many
scholars have disputed this interpretation, especially the application of the SCA
to fiduciaries and opened e-mails. Notwithstanding this commentary, the Revised
FADAA (as did the 2014 FADAA to a large extent) tracks the distinction found
in the SCA.130 Further, because the SCA is a federal statute and the Revised
FADAA is designed only for state enactment, some people have argued that the
Revised FADAA, if enacted, cannot exempt fiduciaries from the SCA’s strict
rules.
While service providers are generally prohibited from divulging the contents
of electronic communications,131 they may ‘‘voluntarily” disclose the contents of
a communication (to anyone other than the government) with the ‘‘lawful
consent” of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such
communication.132 Hence, even if a fiduciary can successfully claim ‘‘lawful
consent,” she may nevertheless be denied access at the discretion of the custodian.
The SCA does not provide the same protection to metadata, such as the
identities of others with whom an account holder has communicated and other
(A)
Any temporary, immediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the
electronic transmission thereof;
(B)
Any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication.
See also See David Horton, ‘‘The Stored Communications Act and Digital Assets,” (2014) 67
Vand L Rev 1729 at 1734 [Horton].
128 18 USC § 2701:(a) Offense.—Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section
whoever—(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided; or(2) intentionally exceeds an authoriza-
tion to access that facility;and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system shall be
punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section [emphasis added].
129 Horton, supranote 127 at 1734, but see that scholars have disagreed onwhether fiduciary
access is ‘‘unauthorized.” See Cahn, supra note 14. See also James D. Lamm et al., supra
note 14.
130 Notes to s. 2, Revised FADAA, supra note 15.
131 18 USC § 2702(1). See infra, note 132.
132 18 USC § 2702(1):(b)Exceptions for disclosure of communications.—A provider
described in subsection (a) may divulge the contents of a communication—(1) to an
addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an agent of such addressee or
intended recipient;(2) as otherwise authorized in section 2517, >2511(2)(a), or 2703 of
this title;(3) with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient
of such communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing service;
[emphasis added].
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details of those communications. This information is the ‘‘envelope” which the
American Acts characterize as the ‘‘catalogue” of communications, defined as:
[I]nformation that identifies each person with which a user has had an
electronic communication, the time and date of the communication,
and the electronic address of the person.133
Because of the distinctions developed in the SCA, the American Acts
separate digital assets into three categories: two categories of communications —
catalogues of electronic communications and the contents of electronic
communications — and the large category of all other digital assets that are
not electronic communications.
Default access is permited only to the catalogue and all other digital assets
except electronic communications. In contrast, s. 5(1)(b) of the ULCC Uniform
Act provides that a fiduciary who has a right under the Act to access a digital
asset of an account holder ‘‘is deemed to have the consent of the account holder
for the custodian to divulge the content of the digital asset to the fiduciary”134
and is deemed ‘‘to be an authorized user of the digital asset.”135 The section also
ensures, inter alia, that fiduciary access does not contravene s. 342.1 of the
Canadian Criminal Code, which deals with the unauthorized use of a computer
or computer service.136
b. Access depending on the type of fiduciary
i. Personal representatives
Under the Revised FADAA, the personal representative of a deceased
individual has default access to digital assets, including the catalogue of
electronic communications, but not to the contents of electronic
communications.137 Default access is subject to specific directions by the
account holder in an online tool or by instructions in the will or other record.
The instructions in an online tool have priority over instructions in the will even
when the online instructions predate the will.138
133 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 2, definition of ‘‘catalogue of electronic communica-
tions.”
134 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
135 Ibid, s. 5(1)(c).
136 Notes to s. 5, ibid; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 [Criminal Code]. This result
follows from the Act’s authorization (or confirmation) of fiduciaries’ right of access,
since the Code prohibits access ‘‘without colour of right”. The Act does not purport to
apply directly to the federal legislation, nor is the federal government invited to enact it.
Canadian law does not require a specific ‘consent’ by the fiduciary to come to this result.
137 ULCC Uniform Act, ibid, s. 8. The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 3, permits default
fiduciary access, subject to thedeceased’swill or a court order, forother than the contents
of electronic communications.
138 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 4(a). The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 3 does not
incorporate the concept of an online tool.
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Access for a personal representative to the contents of electronic
communications is available only if the deceased account holder consented in
her will, an online tool, or by court order.139 There was some debate by the
American drafters whether consent given under a state statute could constitute
consent for the purpose of a federal statute. The best view was that it would.
An online tool is defined as an electronic service provided by the custodian
that allows the user ‘‘in an agreement distinct from the terms-of-service
agreement . . . to provide directions for disclosure or nondisclosure of digital
assets to a third person.”140 The third person is a ‘‘designated recipient” who is
defined as a person ‘‘chosen by an online tool to administer digital assets of the
user.”141A user can also allow or prohibit fiduciary access in a will or other
record, but the online tool will have precedence, as long as the online tool allows
the user to modify or delete a direction at all times.142
The concept of an online tool provides a solution to the problem of a
deceased who dies intestate and for whom no administrator is appointed by a
court. Not every province has a mechanism to deal efficiently with small
estates.143 The designated recipient is empowered to deal with the digital assets of
the intestate, which in the case of many younger persons may be their major or
only asset. The Canadian Act does not provide for an online tool and thus
explicitly ensures access only for fiduciaries appointed under instruments or by
court order.144 It has been suggested by one of the Canadian drafters that they
were reluctant to insert a mechanism like the online tool because it might
undermine the real intentions of the individual. Consider that under the
American scheme an online tool (drawn in the exuberance of youth) would
prevail over a later will ostensively drawn in maturity. One way to resolve this
matter in Canada would be for any online tool legislation introduced to give
priority to later-drawn instruments. Even in the absence of legislation, it is
possible that online tools will be recognized in Canada, if Canadian account
holders simply purport to designate a recipient as allowed by the (US-based)
custodian.145 Some commentators have suggested (due to some uncertainty over
the status of ‘‘click through” agreements) that online tools would not be
139 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 8. The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 3(1) permits
access only if the custodian is permitted to disclose the content under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (18 USC § 2702(b)).
140 Revised FADAA, ibid, s. 2, definition of ‘‘online tool” and s 4. The 2014 FADAA, ibid,
does not contain the concept of online tool.
141 Revised FADAA, ibid, s. 2, definition of ‘‘designated person.”
142 Ibid, s. 4(a).
143 See generallyLawCommissionofOntario,SimplifiedProcedures for Small Estates, Final
Report (Law Commission of Ontario, August, 2015), online: <http://www.lco-
cdo.org>.
144 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 3(1).
145 See Perez v. Galambos, 2009 SCC 48, 2009 CarswellBC 2787, 2009 CarswellBC 2788
(S.C.C.), which emphasizes that the putative fiduciary must explicitly, or impliedly,
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recognized by the courts if they were the product of a ‘‘click through”
agreement.146
The notes to s. 2 of the Revised FADAA state that ‘‘[a] designated recipient
may perform many of the same tasks as a fiduciary, but is not held to the same
standard of conduct.”147 No authority is given for that statement, although there
is a reference in the definition of online tool to ‘‘directions” for disclosure or non-
disclosure that may indicate a limited discretion on the part of the designated
recipient.148
ii. Attorneys
The attorney holding a power of attorney has, under the ULCC Uniform Act,
default access.149 Under the Revised FADAA, an attorney holding a power of
attorney, who has specific authority over digital assets or general authority to act
on behalf of a principal, has default access to the digital assets of the donor, other
than the contents of electronic communications.150 Access under the American
Acts may be restricted by court order, directions by the principal, or by
provisions in the power of attorney.151 The Canadian Act refers to a court order
or provisions in the power of attorney, but not to directions by the principal,
although these would prevail under the general law if the principal is
competent.152
The American Revised FADAA permits an attorney access to digital assets
that are contents of electronic communications only if the power of attorney
expressly permits access.153 It is likely that a significant percentage of existing
powers of attorney do not contain a specific reference to electronic
communications.154
assume fiduciary obligations. It is interesting to speculate the legal effect on adesignation
of a designated recipient by a Canadian.
146 See note 60 above and accompanying text in this article.
147 Revised FADAA, supra note 15.
148 Ibid, s. 2(16).
149 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, ss. 3.
150 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 10. The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 5 also provides
default access.
151 ULCCUniformAct, supra note 1, s. 3(2).Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 10. The 2014
FADAA, supra note 15, s. 5(b) provides for restrictions imposed by a court or the power
of attorney.
152 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 3(2).
153 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 9. The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 5(a) contains a
similar rule.
154 See section 111, 7 of the paper regarding coming into force provisions.
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iii. Trustees
Unlike the ULCC Uniform Act, which gives default access to all trustees, the
Revised FADAA distinguishes between trustees who are original account holders
and those who are not. 155 The American Acts reasonably give trustees who are
original account holders default access to all digital assets including the contents
of electronic communications unless otherwise ordered by a court or provided in
the trust.156
The Revised FADAA gives default access to trustees who are not original
account holders, but only to the catalogue of communications and to digital
assets, and not to the contents of electronic communications.157 Access by a
trustee who is not an original account holder to electronic communications
requires that the trust include ‘‘consent to disclosure of the content of electronic
communications to the trustee.”158
The Revised FADAA also provides procedures to ensure that if the trustee is
not an original account holder, the trust exists: in the words of the Act ‘‘a
certification by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, that the trust exists and the
trustee is currently acting trustee of the trust . . .”.159 If the trustee is not an
original user, trustee access to digital assets is also subject to the directions of the
user/account holder.160
iv. Guardians
Where a fiduciary is a guardian/conservator, the Revised FADAA recognizes
‘‘that the protected person may still retain some right to privacy in their personal
communications.”161 Therefore it does not extend access by a guardian to any
digital assets of a represented individual based on the conservatorship order
alone. The conservator’s access to digital assets must be specifically authorized
by the [guardianship] court and the court’s holding will presumably be informed
by existing state law concerning guardianship.162
While the Revised FADAA does not provide for guardian access to digital
assets without a court order,163 it does permit guardians with ‘‘general authority”
to manage the assets of a protected person to request the custodian ‘‘to suspend
or terminate an account. . .for good cause.”164
155 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 1 definition of ‘‘fiduciary”.
156 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 11. The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 6(2) provides a
similar rule.
157 Revised FADAA, ibid, s. 13.
158 Ibid, s. 12(2).
159 Ibid, ss. 12(3), 13(3).
160 Ibid, ss. 12, 13.
161 Notes to s. 14, Revised FADAA, ibid.
162 Ibid, s. 14(a).
163 Ibid, s. 14(b).
164 Ibid, s. 14(c). See section III.6.
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The Canadian approach of default access seems to allow more access by a
fiduciary to the digital assets of a represented person than the American
approach, but practically the actions and access of the guardian will be
circumscribed by mostly modern legislation adopted by the various provinces
that explicitly attempts to preserve, whenever possible, the represented person’s
privacy and autonomy. In other words, even if the ULCC Uniform Act permits
default access, the guardian’s ability to access the represented person’s digital
(and other assets) may be constrained by the requirements of provincial
guardianship legislation.165 For example, in Alberta the Adult Guardianship and
Trusteeship Act166 limits the powers of the guardian where the represented person
is able to make some decisions,167 although it does not specifically refer to digital
assets.
c. Summary comparison
The Canadian position is one of default access for fiduciaries. The American
position is substantially different so that access under the Revised FADAA is
more limited and less media neutral. The main differences between the Canadian
and the American uniform Acts are that the American Acts:
. distinguish between the contents of electronic communications, catalogues of
those communications, and other digital assets, i.e., those that do not
constitute communications within the meaning of the SCA;
. make access dependent on the type of fiduciary;
. recognize service agreements as being the ultimate arbiter of fiduciary access,
if the account holder has not provided specific directions (not clear in the
2014 FADAA); and
. recognize the right of an account holder to appoint a person (‘‘designated
recipient”)168 in an online tool to manage digital assets (not in 2014 FADAA)
(other than a fiduciary).
165 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 1 definition of ‘‘fiduciary.” See generally Adult
Guardianship and Co-Decision Making Act, S.S. 2000, c. A-5.3, s. 3; S. Burningham,
‘‘Developments in Canadian Adult Guardianship and Co-Decision-Making Law”
(2009) 18:1 Dal JLS 119; Canadian Centre for Elder Studies and British Columbia Law
Institute, ‘‘A Comparative Analysis of Adult Guardianship Laws in BC, New Zealand
and Ontario”, CCELS report no. 4, BCLI report no. 46 (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia, October 2006), online: <www.bcli.org/sites/default/files/Compar-
ative_Analysis_of_Adult_Guardianship_Laws.pdf>.
166 SA, 2008, c. A-4.2.
167 Ibid, s. 15(d).
168 See Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 2, definition of ‘‘designated recipient”; s. 4(a).
FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS 219
III. Access
1. Transferable and Descendible
Under the ULCC Uniform Act, if the fiduciary has a right under the Act to
access a digital asset of an account holder, the fiduciary may take any action
regarding the digital asset that the account holder (assuming she were alive and
of full capacity) could have taken.169 This formulation does not create or imply
additional property rights for the fiduciary or a deceased individual’s heirs.170
Thus in her progress report to the ULCC, Donna L. Molzan, Chair of the ULCC
project, stated ‘‘[t]he Working Committee concluded that a fiduciary should have
no greater property right to the digital asset than the deceased or incapacitated
person had.”171 In this regard, the Canadian Act follows the American lead,
although in the early deliberations among the drafting group of the American
Uniform Law Commission and others, there was some discussion that the
fiduciary might be provided with ‘‘ownership” rights as well as access to digital
assets.172 In a memo dated 11 November 2012 , Suzanne Brown Walsh, chair,
and Naomi Cahn, reporter, asked whether the fiduciary authority should include
the ability to own, manage, and distribute digital property.”173 Subsequently, the
notes to the March 2014 draft of the FADAA provided that:
The Act does not permit the account holder’s fiduciary to override the
terms of the service agreement in order to make a digital asset or
collection of digital assets ‘‘descendible,” although it does preserve the
rights of “the fiduciary to make the same claims as the account holder
. . .”.174
2. The meaning of ‘‘access”
The notes to s. 5 of the ULCC Uniform Act refer to ‘‘accessing the asset,”
‘‘controlling the asset” and ‘‘copying assets” (to the extent permitted by
copyright law).175 While these seem very broad powers, the fiduciary’s ability to
act will be circumscribed by her fiduciary powers under the law of the applicable
jurisdiction.176 Thus, for example, if a fiduciary takes control of a digital asset
169 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 5(1)(a).
170 Ibid, s. 5(b).
171 Molzan, Progress Report, supra note 16 at para. 21.
172 See letter from Allison S. Bohm, Advocacy & Policy Strategist at the American Civil
Liberties Union, to Suzanne Brown Walsh & Naomi Cahn, Chair and Reporter at the
Uniform Law Commission (3 July 2013) Uniform Law Commission, online: <www.u-
niformlaws.org>.
173 Memo from Suzanne Brown Walsh to Naomi Cahn (11 November 2012), online:
<www. uniform laws.org> [emphasis added].
174 Notes to s. 7, 2014 FADAA, supra note 15.
175 Notes to s. 5, ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
176 Ibid, s. 5(1)(a).
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such as a social media account, she will be subject to the same fiduciary duties as
if she had taken control of a bank account or other tangible assets of a
beneficiary. The control will be for the purposes of administration only and not
for any other purposes. In some cases, the mandate of a personal representative
or other fiduciary may extend to continuing an existing business, and the legal
aspects of this relationship with the custodian may be impeded by limits on
fiduciary access and the nature of digital assets.
The ULCC Uniform Act gives the fiduciary the option to apply to the court
‘‘for directions in relation to the fiduciary’s right to access a digital asset . . .”,177
but does not provide explicit options for fiduciary access such as the ones found
in the Revised FADAA.178 The Revised FADAA gives the custodian the choice of
either providing full access to the user’s account including, for example, the
account holder’s password, partial access sufficient to perform the tasks with
which the fiduciary is charged, or a copy of the digital assets (possibly by way of
a data dump, i.e. a bulk transfer of all the data held for the account holder).179
The custodian may assess a ‘‘reasonable administrative charge for the cost of
disclosure.”180
Other provisions in s. 6 of the American Act clarify that a custodian need not
disclose a digital asset deleted by a user,181 and that a custodian may seek
guidance from the court if a request for segregation182 of digital assets is unduly
burdensome.183
3. The terms of service
Under the ULCC Uniform Act, any provision in the terms of service that
limits fiduciary access to digital assets is void184 except if the account holder
assents to it in a separate document from the one that otherwise governs the
account holder.185 This is a significant difference to the Revised FADAA, under
177 Ibid, s. 8.
178 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 6. There is no comparable provision in 2014 FADAA,
supra note 15.
179 Revised FADAA, ibid, s. 6(a).
180 Ibid, s. 6(b). The cost will be likely be determined by the regulations to anyCanadianAct
modelled on the ULCC Uniform Act.
181 Ibid, s. 6(c).
182 ‘‘Segregation” is described in ibid, s. 6(d):
(d) If a user directs or a fiduciary requests a custodian to disclose some, but not all, of the user’s
digital assets, the custodian need not disclose the assets if segregation of the assets would impose
an undue burden on the custodian. If the custodian considers the direction or request to impose
an undue burden, either the custodian or the fiduciary may petition the court for an lorder to
(1)disclose a date delimited subset of the user’s digital assets;
(2)disclose all of the user’s digital assets to the fiduciary or designated recipient;
(3) disclose none of the user’s digital assets, or
(4) disclose all of the user’s digital assets to the court for review in chambers.
183 Ibid, s. 6(d).
184 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 5(2)(a).
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which the terms of service govern, unless the account holder has provided
directions otherwise in the online tool, or in the will, trust, power of attorney or
other record.186 The FADAA provision is likely to reduce fiduciary access to
digital assets, since the custodians will generally have a default rule of no access,
and individuals often do not change default settings.
4. Tangible personal property that holds digital assets
Both the American and Canadian Acts establish that if a fiduciary has
authority over tangible personal property, she also has the right to access any
digital asset stored on it.187 The SCA is not an obstacle for the American model
Acts because the data in the device is not communicated, which is a condition for
the application of the SCA. This is true even for e-mail in the device since the
fiduciary does not depend on the custodian to provide access. As custodian of the
physical medium where the digital assets are stored, the fiduciary is also the
custodian of the digital assets.
The Canadian provision deems the fiduciary to be an ‘‘authorized user of the
property” and hence clarifies that s. 342.1 of Canada’s Criminal Code does not
apply.188 Section 342.1 deals with unauthorized use of a computer and provides
that anyone who ‘‘fraudulently and without colour of right” obtains computer
services is guilty of an offence. Thus even if general fiduciary duties do not give
‘‘colour of right,” the ULCC Uniform Act does.
5. Fiduciary duties
One substantial change from the 2014 FADAA to the Revised FADAA was
the insertion of a quite comprehensive description of the fiduciary duties of
fiduciaries who have access to digital assets.189 In the former enactment, there
was mention only of the applicability of ‘‘other law.”190 The result, according to
the notes to s. 15 of the Revised FADAA, was ‘‘confusing” and ‘‘led to enactment
difficulty.“191
The ULCC Uniform Act simply provides that the duties imposed by law on
fiduciaries in relation to tangible property also apply in relation to digital
185 Ibid, s. 5(2).
186 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 5(c). The 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 7(b) provides
that a provision in the terms of the service agreement that limits fiduciary access is void
unless the account holder ‘‘agreed to the provision by an affirmative act separate from
the account holder’s assent to other provisions of the terms-of-service agreement.”
187 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 15(e); 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 7(e); ULCC
Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 5(3).
188 Criminal Code, supra note 136, s. 342.1.
189 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 15. Section 15 also partially applies to the ‘‘designated
recipient” defined inRevisedFADAA, supranote 15, s. 2(9). See 2014FADAA, supranote
15.
190 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s. 7(a)(1).
191 Revised FADAA, supra note 15.
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assets.192 An argument could be made that the Canadian model should follow
the lead of the Revised FADAA. Provincial legislation in other areas of the law,
such as that regarding powers of attorney or guardianship, has more recently
tended to incorporate detailed descriptions of the fiduciary duties owed, in order
to raise awareness, to educate the putative fiduciaries, and by their explicitness,
to reinforce appropriate behavior.193
6. The right to destroy digital assets
Neither the Canadian nor American Acts explicitly recognize the right of the
account holder, custodian or the fiduciary to destroy digital assets, though the
Revised FADAA does provide that a guardian with general authority to manage
the assets of a protected person ‘‘may request the custodian to suspend or
terminate an account of the protected person for . . . good cause.194
Generally, the right to destroy — if there is such a comprehensive right under
the common law — would be that of the account holder.195 Once the account
holder is incapacitated or executes a power of attorney or dies, then the duties of
the fiduciary may take precedence. As was discussed previously in this paper,196 a
personal representative, for example, has duties not only to the deceased, but also
to creditors (including tax authorities) and beneficiaries. In some limited cases,
the courts have prevented testators from destroying property, especially real
property, on their death.197
The custodian is in a unique position. A refusal to permit access or the
termination of an account effectively ‘‘destroys” the property. On the other
hand, where legislation permits default access, the legislation, by providing
default access, could be interfering with an account holder’s right, if it exists, to
destroy her property (or the ‘‘right to be forgotten”).198 These debates apply to
all types of property, although the tripartite nature of digital property makes the
allocation of responsibility complex.
192 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 4.
193 See e.g. LawReformCommission of Nova Scotia, Powers of Attorney Act: Final Report
2015 (Halifax: LRCNS, August 2015) at s. 8.1.
194 Revised FADAA, supra note 15, s. 14(c).
195 See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ‘‘The Right to Destroy” (2005) 114 Yale LJ 781
[Strahilevitz].
196 See Section I.1(a) ‘‘Personal representatives in Alberta and British Columbia” in this
article.
197 See Strahilevitz, supra note 195, at 796 and the leading case of Eyermore v. Merchantile
Trust Co., 524 SW (2d) 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
198 Rebecca G. Cummings, ‘‘The Case Against Access to Decedents’ E-mail: Password
Protection as an Exercise of the Right to Destroy” (2014) 15 Minn JL Sci & Tech 897.
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7. Coming into force provisions
The ULCC Uniform Act, if adopted, will apply to fiduciaries who are
appointed or instruments that take effect, ‘‘before, on or after the Act comes into
Force.”199 The Working Committee of the ULCC took the view that since the
Act would be essentially declaratory of the existing law and existing powers of
fiduciary access, and therefore did not create a new set of rights but facilitated
the performance of existing duties, it should apply to ensure that fiduciaries have
the power to access digital assets in all cases.
The Working Committee stated that the Act will provide immunity from civil
or criminal consequences of ‘‘good faith” disclosure to fiduciaries. It will not
penalize fiduciaries or custodians who did not obtain or provide access before the
Act was passed.200 It is noteworthy, however, that while the Act will not impose
penalties for non-disclosure or too much disclosure, it is still possible that the
general law might do so where, in particular, beneficiaries lose out.
The 2014 FADAA follows ‘‘the same reasoning and applies the [the Act] in
the same manner.”201
8. Private International Law
Many providers of internet services and goods familiar to Canadians, such as
Facebook, Google, and Dropbox, primarily operate from the United States,
although they may have Canadian subsidiaries.202 Therefore even where an
individual dies or becomes incapable in Canada, she may have some digital assets
governed by a service agreement concluded with, for example, a custodian
incorporated in Maryland, with its servers situated in Nevada and its
management, offices, and employees located in California. As a result,
fiduciary access to digital assets may be subject to either the courts or laws or
both of an American state and possibly to those of the American federal
government.203
It is not without reason that private international law has been called an area
of law of some complexity and difficulty.204 The ULCC Uniform Act simply
provides that ‘‘[d]espite any other applicable law or a choice of law provision in a
service agreement, a provision in a service agreement is unenforceable . . . to the
extent that the provision limits, contrary to this Act, a fiduciary’s access to a
199 Notes to s. 2 of the ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1.
200 Infra, at para. 28.
201 Molzan, Progress Report, supra note 16 at para. 30. See 2014 FADAA, supra note 15, s.
14.
202 SeeEquustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2015 BCCA265, 2015CarswellBC 1590 (B.C. C.A.),
affd 2017 SCC 34, 2017 CarswellBC 1727, 2017 CarswellBC 1728, (sub nom. Google Inc.
v. Equustek Solutions Inc.) (S.C.C.).
203 See generally Stephen G.A. Pitel & Nicholas S. Rafferty, Conflicts of Law, 2d ed.
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) [Pitel].
204 Pitel, ibid.
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digital asset.”205 The challenges arising from the assumption of jurisdiction by
Canadian courts (including the effect of forum selection clauses), the selection of
the applicable law, and the enforcement of orders of Canadian courts in foreign
jurisdictions are yet to be fully addressed by the courts with respect to digital
asset management. Their resolution will ultimately impact the application and
ultimate utility of the new model legislation. An effort to create cross-border
uniformity by the Canadian draftsperson was reduced by the attention paid to
the SCA by the American draftspersons and the 2015 revisions to FADAA,
which the Canadian Working Group did not find desirable.
CONCLUSION
The prefatory notes to the ULCC Uniform Act state that the Act was
necessary because
[a]t present, the law does not deal adequately with how fiduciaries may
gain access to these digital assets. Neither the right of fiduciaries to deal
with digital assets, nor the duty of custodians of digital assets to
provide fiduciaries with access to digital assets, is clear to everyone in
the digital world.206
Only one province in Canada, Alberta, has specifically addressed the issue of
fiduciary access to digital assets. Even so, its legislation extends only to personal
representatives of a deceased.
Without the legislation proposed by the ULCC, there are several possible
impediments to fiduciary access, although none of them, except the terms of the
agreement between the account holder and custodian, present insuperable
obstacles. Impediments could include limits on the ambit of fiduciary duties and
powers arising from legislation, the effect of current privacy laws, and the terms
of agreements mentioned above.
Under the common law, the fiduciary ‘‘steps into the shoes” of the individual
to whom she owes a duty, at least for the purposes of carrying out her fiduciary
duties. Some existing governing legislation seems to narrow the scope of the
fiduciary’s duties by referring specifically to the fiduciary’s duty to administer
‘‘property” or something similar such as ‘‘estate”. The legislation might engender
a rather fruitless discussion of first, what property is, and secondly, whether all
or some types of digital assets, such as ‘‘information” are property. In any case,
the present probate and estate administration legislation, may be viewed as
embedded in, but not limiting, the broader common law.
The ULCC drafters have asserted that Canadian privacy laws do not impede
fiduciary access to digital assets. A survey of the relevant legislation and common
law supports this position, although there may be some limits on access, where
the privacy of third parties is involved.
205 ULCC Uniform Act, supra note 1, s. 6.
206 Prefatory notes to the ULCC Uniform Act, ibid.
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Standard form service agreements between the account holder and the
custodian have the most potential to limit fiduciary access. The agreements,
drafted by the service providers, tend in one way or the other to limit fiduciary
access. Thus, the ULCC Uniform Act provides that terms in service agreements
which limit a fiduciary’s access to digital assets are void unless an account holder
assents by an affirmative act, separate from her assent to other provisions of the
service agreement.
Both the ULCC and the American Uniform Law Commission have
attempted to provide clarity and certainty to the issue of fiduciary access by
proposing draft legislation. Through their efforts, the drafters have had to decide
between default access to digital assets for fiduciaries and other schemes which
require the explicit consent of the account holder for access.
The ULCC Uniform Act favours default fiduciary access to digital assets and,
hence, media neutrality. In other words, the assumption underlying the ULCC
Uniform Act is that digital assets should be treated the same way as other assets
like tangible personal property. The brevity and simplicity of the proposed
Canadian legislation contrasts with the two American Acts, the 2014 FADAA
and its successor, the Revised FADAA, which make fiduciary access dependent
on both the type of fiduciary and the characteristics of the asset.
This difference between the Canadian and American legislation arises from
the perceived legal requirement for American custodians to comply with their
federal Storage Communications Act, which prohibits service providers from
disclosing the contents of electronic communications without the lawful consent
of the account holder. Therefore, fiduciary access to the contents of electronic
communications, as described in the SCA, is generally denied unless consent is
provided by the account holder in an appropriate instrument such as a will, or
power of attorney. Default access (except for guardians and some trustees) is
provided for a large group of other digital assets other than the contents of
electronic communications. The American Acts also provide for a ‘‘catalogue of
electronic communications” which records the name of each person with whom
an account holder communicated, the time and date of the communication and
the electronic address.207 The catalogue is subject to the same disclosure rules as
all other digital assets (default access), except the contents of electronic
communications.
There are two other significant differences between the ULCC Uniform Act
and the Revised FADAA. The first is that the Revised FADAA employs a device
called an online tool that permits the account holder to designate a nominee to
administer her digital assets and to direct disclosure or non-disclosure of them.
The directions in an online tool have priority over consent extended in other legal
instruments. The Canadian Act does not include an online tool. This may
eliminate the ability of some account holders, especially if they die intestate, to
designate a person to deal with their account.
207 Revised FADAA, supra note 10, s. 2(4).
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The other significant difference between the Revised FADAA (but not the
2014 FADAA) and the ULCC Uniform Act is that under the Canadian Act, the
terms of a service agreement cannot preclude fiduciary access, unless there is an
additional separate service agreement concluded to that effect. Under the Revised
FADAA the terms of a service agreement will dictate fiduciary access, unless the
account holder has specifically provided otherwise. Therefore, given account
holder inertia, the custodian tendency to limit fiduciary access may prevail.
The ULCC Uniform Act provides that a choice of law provision in the terms
of the agreement is void if it precludes fiduciary access. The effectiveness of the
clause in the Canadian legislation and of the legislation itself will depend to a
considerable extent on the application of the rules of private international law.
The application of these rules to the ULCC Uniform Act is an area of complexity
which deserves further exploration.
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